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Abstract 
After some theoretical reflections on communicative violence based on the concept of the 
“double body” (Sybille Krämer) which explains why words can heal or hurt, we show 
excerpts from therapeutic session using conversation analysis as methodological tool to 
make subtle forms of violence visible. The problem of violence is not one-sided from 
therapist to patient but the inverse direction should be included, too. We detect that it is 
sometimes the “good will” of therapists to help a patient “overcome” a (supposed) 
“inhibition” to continue talk that contributes to symmetrical escalations in conversation 
causing trouble in turn-taking. Sometimes it is an up-to-now undescribed practice of 
patients, which we call “empathy blinder”. A mild and a more complex form of this 
pattern are described. Further examples are analyzed hoping to direct some attention to 
the problem of communicative violence. In general, we do not yet present solutions, more 
expositions of a problem widely under taboo.  
 
 
Introduction  
In most cases, and all too soon, the keyword „violence” in the context of psychotherapy 
triggers that associative connection which views a (female) patient being sexually 
exploited by a (male) therapist. Then the connection to the public debate on the sexual 
abuse of children soon drags psychotherapy as a whole into an environment where it can 
easily or more easily be discredited and scandalised. As a matter of fact, however, since 
the beginning of the 1980s there has been a wide spread of sensitivity concerning this 
topic in the field of psychotherapy. Professional associations have established ethics 
commissions investigating such cases. Members have been excluded from their 
associations. The book by Phyllis Chesler (1972) had a worldwide impact, for this author, 
herself a psychotherapist, had interviewed women who had been exploited by their 
therapists. These narrations were impressive enough to trigger intensive reactions.  
 
Among international psychoanalysis, in particular Gabbard (1994) discussed the topic 
and described that such incidents happen by a certain sequence: minor transgressions of 
limits – the session is prolonged, an arm is touched, the hand is held a little bit longer 
when saying hallo or goodbye – if they are not at once corrected, become the gateway to 
further steps, such as a more intensive touch, conversations after the session, the use of 
certain objectionable vocabulary, and thus gradually there develops a cycle of ostensive 
intimacies, which the patient must find ever more difficult to escape.  
                                                1 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Prof. Michael Buchholz and Prof. Horst Kächele, International Psychoanalytic University (IPU), Stromstr. 2‐3. 10555 Berlin/FRG, Germany.  E‐mail: michael.buchholz@ipu‐berlin.de, 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It is no question that under no circumstances such incidents can be tolerated in 
psychotherapy, the after-effects are devastating, with local educational institutions the 
effects can be identified as far as in the second and third generations of course 
participants, and they are catastrophic for the public image of psychotherapy. Fortunately, 
such cases of misconduct are not as frequent as scandalisation makes us believe, but they 
are frequent enough. Gabbard (1994) estimates about 10% of all therapists – from all 
schools.  
 
Communicative Violence – Basic Considerations 
Making communicative violence a topic of discussion, however, is connected to different 
problems. Increasingly patients of both sexes, by pointing out to the well-known dangers 
of being sexually abused, demand psychotherapeutic treatment in the context of which 
they do not at all want to speak about sexuality. No exact figures are known about this 
phenomenon. If it is met, such a demand would result in the performance of 
psychotherapy being extremely limited; if it is not met, this may again be lamented as 
communicative violence.  
 
Another problem results from exclusively focussing on male violence towards women. 
Discussing other kinds of communicative violence are found in the surgeries of 
psychotherapists, how they could be defined and delimited from other operations, proves 
to be an extremely difficult task, and the reason for this is treatment technique.  
These problems are interdependet with other more profound.  
 
In psychotherapy process research during a long period of time data were generated by 
questionaires, applied from session to session. Finally, it was discovered that not the in-
session events were observed but another kind of cognitive objects, “opinions about” the 
session. Hence, we have a debate in what way audio- or videotaped data from session can 
be sampled and evaluated. The general shift from cognitive objects to conversational-
interactive events of a session generated completely new observations followed by 
renewed theorizing (Buchholz 2012). Observing kind and length of pauses (Frankel, 
Levitt et al. 2006), the synchrony of bodily movements (Tschacher, Tomicic et al 2012) 
or rhythmization of talk (Buchholz, Spiekerman, Kächele 2015) during a session 
produced new insights in the interactional quality during psychotherapy. One 
consequence is that it is more and more indeterminable what is meant by psychic 
violence. It does make sense to talk of communicative violence, as such acts are 
committed by “talk-in-interaction”. The psychic or mental component could be 
considered as effect of such communicative processes, which remain observable. Thus, 
another question logically follows. Can and should violence distinguished from 
aggression? 
 
Two authors exposed some difficulties with the concept of aggression (Bushman and 
Anderson 2001, Anderson and Bushman 2002). The distinction between “hot” or 
impulsive and “cold” or instrumental aggression cannot be maintained. It originate from 
the juridical world where one tried to establish distinctions between different crimes by 
means of a phase of “cooling down”.  
 
I someone reacts aggressively to a severe insult or abasement within a short interval (30 
seconds) one could assume that he was under the power of his uncontrollable impulses 
and this was considered mitigating. Another person, planfully attacking the aggressor 
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with a delay of two days should be considered as in full responsibility and, thus, punished 
more severely. These authors introduce their paper (2001) quoting George Bernard Shaw: 
“If you strike a child, take care that you strike it in anger, even at the risk for maiming it 
for life. A blow in cold blood neither can nor should be forgiven”. 
 
This quotation illustrates one the one hand the hot-cold distinction convincingly; 
however, it shows how this distinction is based in mundane thinking and is related to the 
psychology of reconciliation and forgiveness. It follows, that this distinction is unusable 
for the motivation or explanation of such acts. The distinction itself survived long in 
psychology, e.g. in the debate about aggressive drive(s). These authors convincingly 
conclude that every aggressive act is composed by an expressive-impulsive together with 
an instrumental component. However, these components cannot be distinguished 
precisely enough. The distinction itself is not detectable in the events, but in our thinking 
about events. 
 
The debates about aggression-as-drive produced another blurredness. The concept of 
aggression serves for both, the designation of something that happens (e.g. when talking 
of an “aggressive act”) and for the explanation of such acts. The result of which are 
unresolvable circular arguments, when e.g. an “aggressive act” is explained by an 
“aggressive drive” or “aggressiveness”. It is as to explain “having no money” by poverty.  
It was a release of this circular thinking when Collins (2008) proposed a microanalysis of 
violent situations; it is discussed with enormous resonance in the social sciences (Aho 
2013, Mazur 2009). The basic assumption is the conceptual switch from personality 
explanations to an explicative situationism. There are describable and observable 
common features of situations that produce violence. Such components are: If a 
perpetrator is determined and has the technical equipment available, if the victim is 
present  and  weak and if bystanders are either not present or do not intervene. To this 
schema Collins (2009, 2013) adds a crucial emotional component. He observes in 
numerous examples how humans execute violence with an astonishing amount of 
incompetence, which is a piece of circumstantial evidence against the assumption of a 
“drive”. Humans do not express anger or rage in their face during fights but anxiety. This 
tension of incompetence (not being able to hurt) and anxiety (to be hurt) Collins 
designates as “confrontational tension/fear”. To overcome tension/fear needs special 
trainings. Confrontational tension/fear is accompagnied by a sudden high increase of 
heart beat unabling untrained people to precisely and welldirected slap or punch an 
adversary or to use a pistol or gun skillfully. Most people are in an emotional “tunnel” 
and have to aquire psychological techniques to leave the tunnel in order to execute 
violence with competence. 
 
A situationist approach could lead further in the analysis of communicative violence. One 
must not dive into the depth of personality before things are observed and described 
precisely. In psychotherapy and in process research we seriously lack precise 
observations rich in details, while the market of original interpretations flourishes. A 
recent example is the public debate, which kind of diagnosis could be ascribed to the co-
pilot of the Germanwings flight who steered his aircraft with 150 people directly against 
a mountain in the alpes.  
 
A study to “the pull of hostility” (Lippe, Monsen, Ronnestad et al. 2008) can be assigned 
to such a situationist approach. Out of a huge pool of transcribed treatments 28 were 
selected. Every therapist had a successful and a non-successful treatment therein. 14 
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therapists were studied this way. The sessions were evaluated in defined segments with 
SASB2 in dimensions like dominance or response by symmetric escalation strategies. As 
expected it could be shown that in those treatments where therapists respond to difficult 
situations symmetrically, e.g. to accusations with accusation or, in a weaker version, with 
justifications, treatment outcome was bad. However, as the same therapists had positive 
treatment outcomes, this could not be attributed to a personality trait of the therapist. The 
authors speak of a dance of escalation. It’s powerfulness steers over individual-personal 
components. 
 
We want to try a situationist approach here without to begin with an abstract definition of 
violence. We want to present examples that can be considered as having a violent 
potential and we expect from a rich description of such situations some analytic 
potentials. We want to analyze these examples in their own right without approaching too 
quickly to more general considerations. 
 
Readers may allow us to add a further consideration. As humans understand themselves 
to be autonomous beings, already seeing a person offering help, as the therapist is 
according to his/her functional definition, is an enterprise that is prone to violation. 
Krämer (2007) has emphatically underlined man’s “double body” in a sense which is of 
significance here. Not only human bodies may be violated. As human individuals always 
also operate by way of symbols, move within a cultural period and within a social, not 
only physical space, they may become interesting and may be desired or being labelled as 
boring and rejected. They may feel touched and are indeed touched, both by contempt 
and by being respected and attracting attention; the refusal of respect or even ignoring 
their personality in the sense of a basal withdrawal of resonance (Buchholz and Gödde 
2013) is perceived as a violation – precisely because of this “double body”, which may 
result in a verbal attack being perceived in the same way as a physical attack, triggering 
appropriate effects. That is why one may feel  poisened or purified after a conversation, 
besmeared or lifted up by contact, hurt, violated or loved by a glane in the other’s eyes. It 
is such elusive moments which we intend to view at here: Moments of the volatile which 
often escape the perception of others, and later, when we tell what has happened, are 
rather met with disbelief instead of making us credible witnesses. We do not intend to 
practice one-sidedness and accuse the therapists right from the beginning, we will also 
present examples of the violent power of some of the psychotherapeutic patients. This 
does not mean siding with one or the other side, this is no unstable balance. It is due to 
the insight how risky the therapeutic enterprise is and that for this reason it is a good 
thing to have recorded elusive moments, because often they are not really remembered 
but just brought to mind as a “feeling” by those having been hurt by something they are 
often unable to determine, after all; sometimes “countertransference analysis” rather 
obscures than clarifies such moments. 
 
This does not really come as a surprise, as inevitably the way of operating of 
psychotherapy intervenes, nay, must intervene, in the violation-sensitive field of 
autonomy, and this while at the same time displaying the virtue of doubtlessly respecting 
the patient, his/her political or aesthetical opinion, his/her way of life. However, this 
respect must be balanced by skillfully handled disrespect (Frei, Michel and Valach 2012, 
2013). Therapists know that precisely way of life practices are co-responsible for 
                                                
2 “Structural  Analysis  of  Social  Behavior”  –  a  widely  used  multidimensional circumplex model developed by Lorna Smith Benjamin (1974). 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lamented symptoms. Who tries to cope with sorrow by way of eating, to then seek 
treatment for his/her adiposity, will have to change his/her autonomous way of life to a 
certain degree; who fights loneliness by way of excessive promiscuity and then gets 
caught in a thus resulting cycle, cannot be therapeutically helped if his/her implicit 
“doctrine of the art of living”, demanding the satisfaction of every need, is not radically 
put to question.  
 
Thus we arrive at the question of how far empathy may or is supposed to go? For 
example, from infant research (Braten 2007) we know that the withdrawal of empathy is 
experienced as a painful loss but may as well be applied as a means of enforcing 
obedience or punishment. However, is it not that precisely in therapeutic dialogues there 
is sometimes the need for a limitation of empathy? Moreover, can therapists always just 
“accompany” – or are they supposed to – or is it not that they also have the task of 
pointing out to harmful ways of behaviour, of explaining painful connections, of 
correcting attitudes that might resist the therapy? Therapeutic understanding requires 
certain preconditions.  
 
These are the questions we like to discuss here, however we will rather be able to list the 
problems than to offer definitive solutions. By way of excerpts from transcripts from our 
own conversation-analytical studies we will discuss therapeutic dialogues (Peräkylä and 
Antaki 2008); we will not discuss rough, physical forms of violence but only the “small” 
forms of violent speech that are not even due to the speakers’ bad intentions but often to 
their noble intentions. The violent nature of their speech becomes obvious by the 
reactions. Thus, we make use of a methodical basic principle of conversation analysis 
(Schegloff 2007, Sidnell and Stivers 2013). Each statement has its own linguistic form, its 
function becomes obvious by the “second move”, the recipient’s answer. This way 
meaning is created locally and situatively, by each following statement getting its own 
design, which only makes the second speaker’s position understandable for the first one. 
We would like to use the same methodical steps – form and function, design and 
positioning – for those statements by therapists who try to “repair” damage, thus creating 
an emphatic gain that will be therapeutically helpful again. 
 
Example: An escalation 
Let us look in detail at a German conversation between a male patient and a female 
psychoanalyst.3 It is the beginning of the treatment, the patient tells about his girlfriend 
who up to then has acted as kind of therapist for him. Here we would like to focus less on 
the content (why we selected a segment that on first glance seems not understandable) of 
the conversation but on the way it is organised: who speaks how and after whom? In 
which way is the break dealt with? Whose is the next conversational move?4 
 
P: well. (--) she has well (--) but somehow I couldn’t do that to her (--) that was 
justified, after all, you know it was no exaggeration or so and she didn’t (--) she 
prohibited me from doing it like women do (laughs) that hurts me I don’t like that 
(laughs) you know err (.) well 
                                                
3 The German original is inserted in italics in order to enable reader to follow the German version 
4 We are very grateful to Christine Reuter, Göttingen, for allowing us to quote this example from her forthcoming dissertation thesis. 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P: ja. (--) das hat sie ähm (--) aber das ich konnte ihr das irgendwie nicht (--) das 
war schon berechtigt also das war jetzt nicht übertrieben oder so und sie hat auch 
nicht (--) sie hats mir verboten wie es Frauen verbieten ((lacht)) das tut mir weh ich 
möcht das nicht ((lacht)) also ähm↑  
 (15.0) 
T: well, she’s afraid of losing you, 
T: also die hat Angst dass sie sie verlieren könnte, 
P: yes, (3.0) that well (9.0) but somehow it is yes she is 
P: ja, (3.0) das äh (9.0) doch es ist irgendwie schon ja das hat sie  
 (27.0) 
 
We would like to take note of three particular features of the patient’s way of expression: 
a) Expressions such as “justified after all” are “intensifiers” of a weak kind. The 
patient assures himself, as if being in the position of another speaker, of this 
having been “justified after all” (similar to the description given in Streeck 2012) 
b) As Bergmann observed (1980), the form of the litotes is used also here, to 
emphasize a different, here: friendly, intention by way of contrasting it to 
something negative.  
c) The many self-corrections after starting to speak and then stopping show multiple 
speech plans and intentions that violate Grice’s maxim of quantity (Grice 1975). 
 
Here there may follow an analysis of form, design and positioning: the analysis of the 
form shows that the patient speaks from an external position; he speaks while at the same 
time evaluating his own statements. The design of his statement with its many restarts is 
hardly addressee-oriented; even when reading slowly one hardly understands what he 
wants to say. The function becomes obvious by the therapist’s reaction. By the patient 
evaluating his own statements, at the same time he excludes the therapist from 
conversation. As also Streeck (2012) has described it as a mode typical for anxious 
patients, he rather talks to himself instead of to an addressee. Finally, this interpretation is 
also supported by the 15 seconds break after having stopped in mid-sentence.  
 
At the same time, his speech ends with a “starter”, this “you know well”; if on this 
occasion one breathes in and says “you know”, one unmistakably indicates the intention 
to go on accompagnied by a high pitch boundary tone. But this indication to go on talking 
is contradicted by the long break. The break indicates that the patient gives up on his turn. 
The multi-modality of the conversation falls apart; the intonation moves upwards, the 
sentence is not finished – all this indicates an ambiguity if this is a “transition relevant 
place” (Clayman 2013)? However in contrast the therapist may perfectly understand the 
long break as being granted the right to speak already now.  
 
This is a situation in which the therapist can only make “mistakes”. If taking the turn and 
starting to speak she reacts to one half of the invitation, by not taking the turn she ignores 
the other half. This is a typical “slot”, from which soon the objection will be raised that 
the therapist constantly interrupts the patient (Streeck 2001). Here, the therapist takes her 
turn by immediately connecting to the last spoken word („well”, “also” in German). She 
speaks as if continuing his words5. Doing so, she might believe to have verbalised in a 
helpful and sensitive way what the patient himself has not yet been able to express. She 
might believe to have helped with the dialogue. This is also because once again the 
                                                
5 This much more prominent in the German version. 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patient makes a break of 27 seconds that again is introduced by the same contradictious 
conversation format: an unfinished sentence with a high pitch boundary tone and at the 
same time a long break. Before going on with this example, we would like to insert a few 
theoretical considerations.     
        
The “interaction engine” 
One should not shrink back from the expression “interaction engine” as suggested by 
Levinson (2006); it is not more mechanical than therapists speaking of a “defence 
mechanism”. Often Freud spoke of the “psychic apparatus”. Conversation analysts focus 
most of all on how the exchange between speakers is organised. Observing the 
organisation of the exchange means taking expression formats as answers by the 
participants to silent questions, questions such as: “Whose turn to speak is it now?” “Who 
chooses the next speaker?” “Which topic might suit now?” This way, very pragmatically, 
conversation partners solve the problem of not constantly interrupting each other. 
Conversation analysts consider their statements solutions for all questions permeating a 
conversation.  
 
When Freud (1916) said that in psychoanalysis nothing happens instead of an “exchange 
of words” (see Scarvaglieri 2013), of course he did not intend to exclude the significance 
of gestures, gazes, facial expressions but to distance himself from nebulous assumptions 
that in psychoanalysis there happens a kind of hypnotic mesmerism, a kind of suggestive 
influencing by help of electro-magnetic powers or something. From Breuer’s famous 
patient, Anna O., he had adopted the expression “talking cure”. Indeed, the “exchange of 
words” has a certain, seemingly rationalist, logic that is transgressed by metaphorical 
expressions such as “verbal) sparring”. That is why Bourdieu (1987, p. 148; 1990), when 
speaking about G. H. Mead, refers to the latter’s remarks on sparring between boxers. For 
Mead, and Bourdieu follows him there, this practice is really a paradigm of a “logic of 
practice”: each gesture triggers a reaction, “each posture of the opponent” is treated “like 
a significant sign of a meaning”. The logic of practice, says Bourdieu, was used already 
by Mead for transgressing the limits of an understanding of the “exchange of words” 
which interprets meaning just hermeneutically. Gumbrecht (1995, p. 136) reminds to 
Jorge Luis Borges referring to George Bernhard Shaw, by saying Shaw’s language was a 
“reinvention of the Middle Ages”, as he was writing a kind of English belonging to the 
time of Jack Dempsey (then world boxing champion). Boxing serves as a store of images 
for a metaphor, which is not seldom transferred into the sphere of conversation. Against 
this background, it does not come as a surprise when Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
exemplarily illustrate their then innovative idea of conceptual metaphors by the example 
of “argument is war”. Also in the academic debate, the origin domain of war has often 
been exploited for metaphorical expressions (“he had to vacate his position”) of the more 
abstract domains. 
 
These considerations can be continued in so far as stating a continuity (Buchholz 2011) 
from particularly the interaction of the child, which is dominated by gestures (Braten 
2009), and its continuation as far as to using linguistic symbols. As it is well known, 
Mead adopted from Wilhelm Wundt “language as gesture”. Modern cognition-theoretical 
works on enactivism (Di Paolo, Rohde, Jaegher 2011), on extended mind (Menary 2011), 
on embodied cognition (Shapiro 2011) take their innovative nature precisely from 
vehemently distancing themselves from earlier, still modularistic or genetic concepts of 
“cognition”. Thinking and speaking are considered to be embodied (for psychotherapy 
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see Buchholz 2014), the earlier computer metaphor of mind is considered to have been 
overcome. “Embodied interaction” (Streeck, Goodwin, LeBaron 2011) might be 
considered the perspective which, when it comes to the “exchange of words”, is indeed 
able to take “sparring” into consideration, thus raising our awareness of violations by 
words in a way as Krämer has described it by the term “double physicality” (s. a.). 
However, if “trouble” occurs and one interrupts each other, there is a wide range of 
“repair activities” (Egbert, Golato et al. 2009, Kitzinger 2013, Sidnell 2007), which 
appear regularly and in an interculturally stable way as a conversational practice for each 
exactly describable situation (Stivers, Enfield et al. 2009). If these repairs do not work, 
“trouble” increases to become a serious problem – on the form and function of these 
repairs as well as on their failure we will soon say more.  
 
Levinson (2006) shows how important the “interaction engine” has become in the course 
of evolution. Humans are very much both dependent on cooperation and particularly 
capable of it. The “interaction engine” makes sure that an expression has been heard and 
is answered as such (and not just as a kind of “noise”), that an indicating gesture has been 
followed by a look, that a cry has been heard as coming from need and not just as a kind 
of noise. Gradually, interaction was organised around cooperative principles. 
 
Purposefully, Levinson speaks of an “interaction” and not of a “conversation engine”. 
Even if humans – such as aphasics – have only extremely reduced possibilities of 
conversation and one can hardly make conversation with them, interaction is definitely 
possible (Jakobson 1955, Goodwin 2000 und 2012, Heschen und Schegloff 2003, Mellies 
und Winneken 1990). This is the case even if humans cannot use sounds but must refer to 
spontaneous sign language – in case of speaking foreign languages, of being behind a 
window, or over distances.  
 
Organising interaction around cooperative principles includes answering not to a 
speaker’s (visible) behaviour but to his/her invisible, initially short-term intentions and 
later long-term plans, and later still to images. “Interaction is by and large cooperative” 
(Levinson 2006, p. 45). Interaction produces chains and sequences that can be learned by 
any novice to a culture and which make it easier to reliably predict the behaviour of 
others. The decisive step is: Such chains and sequences are not based on abstract rules 
but on situative and local expectations. Thus interaction does not depend on language, as 
expectations and intentions may be secured also in a non-linguistic way and by way of 
cooperation. Interaction is “deeper a layer” than talking. Interaction creates actual and 
local roles in the context of situated, contextual production, pairs of roles such as 
“inquirer-answerer”, “giver-receiver”. These pairs of roles are determined by mutual 
expectations, so that there develops an interaction structure that is sufficiently stable for 
the solving of cooperation tasks.  
 
This stability is created by momentarily binding individual gestures to accompanying 
verbal expressions, facial expressions and prosody (Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 1996) – 
all this is bound up to a multi-modal stream of signals. The components of this bond are 
expected to fit together to a large degree, because otherwise a listener would not be able 
to safely understand the speaker’s intention. There is a physical basis for such an 
attachment (Franke 2008, Vuust, Wallentin et al. 2011, Dausendschön-Gay und Krafft 
2002).  
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Back to the example 
After these clarifications we may come back to the example, and now we at once realise 
the problem. By his unfinished sentence the patient makes obvious that he would like to 
go on speaking; however the long breaks contradict this expectation, they irritate the 
therapeutic listener: is she allowed to say something now? The conversation channels are 
not “bound together”, in the sense that the therapist could expect clearly decipherable 
intentions from the patient. Is this a “transition relevant place” (TRP, Clayman 2013), in 
the sense that the therapist being allowed to say something without causing “trouble”? Is 
it her turn now or not? This pattern is repeated immediately after this passage: 
 
P: well, this may be you know I think it is still too fresh (--) to say so  
But↑ 
P: ja, das kann sein also das ist jetzt glaub ich noch zu kurz (---) um das sagen zu 
können aber ↑ 
 (6.0) 
T: but still this could (--) the thought just came to me if this well somehow I’m not 
saying (-) frightens Anny but isn’t doesn’t (.) simply pleasure (.) a pleasure for her.  
T: aber trotzdem könnte diese (---) war eben so mein Gedanke ob das nicht äh bei 
Anke ein bisschen ich will nicht sagen Angst macht aber doch nicht nur nicht nur 
erf Freude macht. 
 
Once again, the patient does not finish a sentence, once again he makes a longer break, 
thus inviting his conversation partner to speak, although he leaves his sentence 
unfinished. Once again it stays unclear if this is a transition relevant point. And once gain 
the therapist continues by going on with the patient’s last word, “but”.  
 
“Speaker’s turn-internal breaks” (Schegloff 2007) are found with many dialogues, here 
you get the described form. Just a few dialogue sequences later, and we see how the 
session escalates: 
 
P: well I don’t try to connect this to any kind of rivalry but (--) well I do perceive it if 
for example he somewhat gives expression to it you know (--) I think last time I 
told you about the weekend ten days ago (-) when the two really freaked out well  (-
) well ↑ 
P: also ich versuche da keinerlei Rivalität rein zu bringen aber (-) äh ich nehme 
das schon wahr wenn das von ihm so zum Beispiel mal ein bisschen kommt also (-) 
ich hab glaube ich das letzte mal erzählt von vor zehn Tagen das Wochenende (-) 
da wo die beiden sehr stark ausgerastet sind so (-) äh ↑ 
 (4.0) 
P: then (-) I somewhat thought he really wants to know what’s going on or somehow 
he wants ↑ 
da (-) hab ich schon so ein bisschen gedacht er will schon wissen was los ist oder er 
will irgendwie ↑ 
 (6.0)  
P: well yesterday (-) yesterday the day before yesterday? We went to the hockey 
match on the car because now the two wanted to see and they came along a:nd (-) I 
was sitting in the frontseat and took my arm around her (-) well seat and that was 
when from behind there was this little knock you know [ (?? )] ↑ 
ja gestern sind wir mit dem (-) gestern, vorgestern? gestern sind wir mit dem Auto 
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äh zum Hockey gefahren weil die beiden jetzt auch mal gucken wollten und sind da 
mitgefahren u:nd (-) äh da hab ich (.) saß ich vorne und hab den Arm um *Name* 
(-) ähm Sitz gemacht und da kam von hinten so ein kleiner Klopfer also    [( ??)] ↑ 
T:                            [ (?? )] 
P:                               [ (?? )] 
T:                                 [ (??)] leave my wife alone  
                              [(??)] gehn Sie weg von meiner Frau 
P: well, (2.0) well you know I’m sure he didn’t mean it but from his side it was kind 
of a game ( ) that ↑ 
P: nja, (2.0) äh also von ihm her sicherlich nicht bewusst sondern es war so von ihm 
her so ne Art spielen (    )  das 
 (3.0) 
T: mmh=mmh 
 
Although the patient did not intend to make this “kind of rivalry”, nevertheless it is 
suddenly there: the spare brackets mark where there happens a fight for the right to 
speak6 which could not be identified when many times listening to the tape. Both 
conversation partners are starting to say something, but only very shortly, each intrudes 
the other’s speaking space, and then the rivalry, which was to be prevented is staged by 
the organisation of the conversation. The space of speaking, that is the metaphorical 
container “into which” rivalry is introduced. 
 
Here, the therapist’s expression formats take up the form of “quasi quotations” (Buchholz 
2003). She speaks as if quoting the patient, as formulating for him, formulating what he is 
as yet incapable of saying. However, by this helpful attitude she overlooks that all she can 
do is „wrong”: either she follows the hints that the patient wants to go on speaking or that 
she shall take her turn – either way the patient could then accuse her of not having 
“understood” him. Taking turns of speaking is organised in a highly ambivalent way here. 
Thus, inevitably the therapist will be blamed, blamed for intruding into the space of 
speaking, for seemingly unjustifiably usurping the right to speak, which is why one is 
entitled to take it from her in the course of a small, escalating fight for the right to speak, 
and she will have to admit her guilt, for it was her who “started it” – at least this is the 
way the patient understands the situation. (Streeck 2001 makes a related observation.) 
Here precisely the helpful attitude contributes to the clash.  
 
Example: Autonomy-sensitive repair 
Our next example comes from a psychoanalytical first interview with a compulsive 
neurotic patient, called the “student” (Thomä and Kächele 1985). In the first minutes the 
                                                
6  Schegloff  (1987,  S.  207)  starts  his  explanation  of  social  organization  by  way  of „talk‐in‐interaction” by the following description: „When persons talk to each other in interaction, they ordinarily talk one at a time and one after the other. When their talk  is  not  produced  serially  in  this manner,  they  generally  act  quickly  to  restore ‚order’;  someone  quickly  steps  in  to  fill  the  silence;  someone  stops  talking  (or several  someones  do)  to  resolve  the  simultaneous  talk;  or  if  two  or more  of  the participants  continue  talking,  their  talk  takes  on  a  special  character  of ‚competitiveness’  (it  is  louder  or  higher  pitched,  for  example)”.  This  fight  for  the right to speak, this „competitiveness” is the boxing match Bourdieu (2007) refers to. 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patient had expressed his guess that his compulsive acts might be due to the fact that as a 
child, when playing in the woods, he had been locked into a log pile by other children and 
that they did not let him come out. Shortly after having told this experience he takes off 
his jacket, and while he does so there develops the following conversation sequence 
which we would like to analyse at first as such and then in a wider context: 
 
T: !ALREADY HERE! you have even (1) .hhh almost felt boxed in? 
↑right now? and then you took off that jacket?  
T: HIER HABEN Sie sich auch schon (1) .hhh fast eingeengt? gefühlt? ↑gerade? 
und sich dann die Jacke ausgezogen? 
P: pfff boxed in? I think it was rather the heat yes indeed (.) sure=  
P: pfff eingeengt? I glaub das war eher die Wärme ja doch (.) klar= 
 
The conversational operation performed by the therapist here is precarious. It consists of 
three different components: a) cognitively connecting – by the particle “even” – the 
situation of feeling boxed in, as it was told as a childhood experience, with being boxed 
in by the actual conversation situation; b) connecting a confrontative reproach with a 
visible behaviour during the session, that is taking off the jacket; c) constructing a 
motivation, the claim that the patient had “almost felt boxed in”, which is formulated 
while the voice is getting louder.  
 
Already in 1932 Alfred Schütz (1932/1973) had distinguished between “for the purpose 
of” and “because” motivations which are a constant element of everyday conversation. In 
the Lebenswelt the teleological formulation (“for the purpose of”) is not illegal, it 
coexists with the causal motivations of “because”. However, it is conspicuous that such 
attributions of motivations are almost always made only while referring to oneself. If they 
address somebody else, Schütz found out, in most cases such attributions of motivations 
come along with a negative addition (“You are doing this only because …”). Attributing a 
motivation to somebody else, even more if he/she is him/herself not aware of it, is a 
conversation-technically very precarious enterprise. Usually such a construction of a 
motivation is rejected because it is perceived as an interference with my autonomy; it 
seems as if the conversation partner knows better than I the motivations which have 
driven my behaviour.  
 
On the other hand, working out a previously I-alien motivation is a so to speak exemplary 
description of the task of “uncovering therapy”. The therapist is almost obliged to present 
such constructions of motivations, and he/she expects to be rejected, which is due to the 
patient’s need of autonomy. In so far, being told why one has just taken off one’s jacket is 
a “disrespectful” intrusion into a patient’s sphere of autonomy – and he/she will react by 
rejecting it, by adding a motivation of his own, may it be the heat. If this is a 
rationalisation in the clinical sense must be left open here. We note that in this sequence it 
is the patient who is said to be motivated by feeling boxed in. 
 
Here, the entire context of the sequence. The patient tells about his newly started studies, 
which he has started after having dropped out of his law studies: 
 
P: an:d there I have many different subjects, (.) that is already (.) quite positive for me 
if I don’t have to always concentrate on one, well?=  
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2015, 4 (2), 4-33  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2015.007 
 
15 
P: un:d da hab ich also viele verschiedene Fächer, (.) dis is schoma (.)  für mi ganz 
positiv wenn i net immer auf öin so rumreite muss, gä?= 
T:                                            =hm= 
P:                                                =excessive, (-) I’ve also got many well ehm  pleasant 
subjects; (.) 
=exzessiv, (-) i hab auch viele äh angenehme Fächer; (.) 
T. yes:?  
T: ja:? 
P: like (.) what I do I know,  many sports things also, (.) 
P: so (.) was weiß ich viele sportliche Sache auch, (.) 
T: hm, 
T: hm, 
P: a cooking class and, you know, like media education subjects;  
P: n Kochkurs und halt so Medienpädagogische Fächer; 
T: ↓hm, 
P: and that: is quite good for me after all (?)= 
P: und des: tut mir eigentlich ganz gut (?)= 
T:                                  = this is where you can better unfold your talents 
T:                             =da können sie sich dann mehr entfalten 
P: yes:, 
P: ja:, 
T: then law paragraphs don’t make you feel (---) 
T: da werden sie nicht durch Paragraphen so (--) 
P: boxed in yes (-) 
P: eingeengt ja (-) 
T: !ALREADY HERE! you have even (1) .hhh almost felt boxed in? ↑right now? and 
then you took off that jacket?  
T: HIER HABEN Sie sich auch schon (1) .hhh fast eingeengt? gefühlt? ↑gerade? 
und sich dann die Jacke ausgezogen? 
P: pfff boxed in? I think it was rather the heat yes indeed (.) sure=  
P: pfff eingeengt? I glaub das war eher die Wärme ja doch (.) klar= 
T:                                                       =°yes?° 
T:                                                                                                =°ja?° 
P: =conveyed like [this  
P: =vermittelt auch irgendwie [so 
T:        [indeed? yes, hm;  
T:    [ja? ja, hm; 
(1) 
T: really? really? I !WELL! I could imagine that the room, you know;  
T: so? so? I MEI i könnt mir vorstelln das so der Raum:, 
P: well  it is (.) quite small yes  
P: der is scho (.) ziemlich klein ja 
T: !SMALL! (-) I  thought so: that you’ve got this feel[ing 
T: KLEIN (-) dacht ich so: dass sie das Gefühl gekriegt hab[n 
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P:                                            [but this hasn’t got we  ha h with 
claustrophobia [it might even be smaller I wouldn’t [mind  
P:                      [aber mit Platzangscht hat des ja 
ha h aber nicht[s also der könnt auch noch kleiner sein des würde mir [nichts 
ausmache 
T:              [no                         [yes, yes, no; bu:t; (-) maybe cramped;  
T:  [nein             [ja, ja, nee; a:ber; (-) vielleicht eingeengt; 
 (1.3) 
T: >Oh this< (-) is a feeling I’ve got (.) 
T: >Ah des< (-) is a Gefühl von mir (.) 
P: hm (-) 
P: hm (-) 
T: i::f this:: is important that you take care if you feel cramped,  
T: o::b das:: das wichtig wäre dass sie darauf achten ob sie sich eingeengt fühlen, 
P: .hh perhaps I’ve i:gnored that much too long (.), 
P: .hh des hab i viel zu lang (.) verna:chlässigt, 
 
The development of the autonomy-sensitive construction of a motivation becomes clearly 
visible if one notices how the therapist at first confronts the patient with the statement 
that he had “almost felt boxed in”. The statement is qualified by the word “almost” which 
serves for creating a soft conversational environment. He does not only use a soft 
formulation in form of a question for his construction of a motivation but audibly rises his 
voice (indicated by ↑) when saying that word which is supposed to link the current 
situation with the just mentioned one: “right now”. This might indicate that he is aware of 
the precarious confrontation. His rejection of the patient’s attribution of a motivation, 
who just the same presents an alternative motivation, “heat”, makes the therapist step by 
step retreat to his original position, however he maintains his attribution of a motivation 
as a situative assumption. At the end of this section it is the therapist who says: “maybe 
cramped. Oh this is a feeling I’ve got”. It stays communicatively unclear if here the word 
“feeling” means “this is the impression I’ve got” or if his “feeling” already refers to the 
then following recommendation, that is if it was important for the patient to take care of 
this feeling of being cramped. Such communicative vagueness has often been observed 
with conflict communication (Donnellon, Gray et al. 1986, Donnellon 1996). Here 
vagueness refers to the speaker’s perspective, thus getting a hidden meaning: The feeling 
of being boxed in, which initially is clearly attributed to the patient, is now revoked; the 
therapist so to speak admits a mistake, without clearly saying so – and the patient can be 
“satisfied” with this and can now himself continue with the remark that he had “ignored 
this much too long”. 
 
The Correction Engine 
In the above quoted paragraph there is another autonomy-sensitive construction. The 
therapist’s construction of a motivation, which has proved to be wrong, is understood by 
the patient, again erroneously, in the sense of the therapist suggesting “claustrophobia” as 
diagnosis, to which once again he reacts by being slightly irritated, to then react by a 
clear, although incomplete, rejection “but this hasn’t got ha h with claustrophobia” – one 
must complete this by inserting “to do”. This correction is important for the patient 
because without such a correction he would have the impression of “not being understood 
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correctly”, which would give reason to the fear that without such a correction he would 
not provide the therapist with the necessary hints for a “correct” understanding of his 
disturbance. The therapist confirms this correction by a “no” – also here we may 
complete: “this hasn’t got to do with claustrophobia”. 
 
The form of such a correction by the therapist has two functions: 
a) The therapist reacts in an autonomy-sensitive way and revokes his statement when 
the patient indicates his irritation. 
b) Revoking is itself an active information telling the patient about the therapist’s 
“positioning”; i. e. that the latter is ready to respect the patient’s autonomy and 
will indeed not authoritatively enforce options for an interpretation. 
 
Both from empirical infant research and from the observation of mother-infant dialogues 
(Corrin 2010) we know quite well that by far the biggest share of everyday interaction 
with small children consists of such “repairs”. Sometimes mothers do not understand 
their children’s intentions and correct their own activities only after the children have 
continued to state their discontent. An appropriate interaction cycle may be understood as 
a contribution to developing a “sense of autonomy”; Emde (1988) was the first to point 
out that here, already at a prelingual state, there develops a mode of “relationship-on-
relationship” conversation which in the realm of developed linguality would be called a 
“commentary”. In the field of social-psychological game theory, already Morton Deutsch 
(1958) pointed out that even under communicatively extremely restricted conditions, 
when the players may only make a few moves without seeing or speaking to each other, 
one tries to deliver such silent messages to be able to inform the other about one’s own 
intention to go on with playing cooperatively or competitively. This finding suits 
perfectly here; repairs are no “mistakes” but itself important means for an autonomy-
sensitive conversation in a therapeutic context.  
 
Such an analysis moves at the topical-semantic level, leading to mutual attributions and 
their corrections and proneness to mistakes. It shows how both participants continuously 
work on informing each other about their mutual positions as speakers, in a way which 
make the statements make sense, so that the heard meaning of the information can be 
ratified within a certain range of tolerance by the expressed intentionally stated meaning. 
Granted, each statement may be understood “in this or this way”; to make conversation 
progress, every speaker must be able to be sure that a certain range of agreement is not 
left or is at least corrected on time. Here we see how one correction is so to speak 
swapped for another one. We assume that the “correction engine” works on the basis of 
those principles as above described for the “interaction engine”.  
 
Example: Intrusion 
The following example comes from the 152nd psychoanalytical session of patient Amalie, 
about which Thomä and Kächele have informed in detail in the second volume of the 
Ulmer Lehrbuch. The session under consideration here has already been analysed on 
several occasions (Erhardt, Levy et al. 2014; Kächele, Thomä 2003; Deppermann, 
Lucius-Höhne 2008; Kächele, Albani et al. 2006). These studies are based on the Ulm 
Transcription (Mergenthaler and Kächele 1988) which, however, has proven to be in 
need of correction in several respects when listening once again to the audio recording, 
which is why here we quote from a new transcription according to the GAT standard 
(Hepburn and Bolden, 2013). So much on the context of the here presented section: 
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The patient suffers from so called hirsutism, that is male body hair, which can hardly be 
treated medically, and cosmetically only with much effort. In despair, she had joined a 
monastery but then left it again to become a teacher. Then she had heard about the 
possibilities of psychoanalytic treatment. In the course of this treatment she gains so 
much self-confidence and courage that after some time she starts her first sexual 
relationship with a man, in the context of which she discovers bodily enjoyment. She 
starts the 152nd session by telling about a dream about which much has been written. She 
dreams that a black man is about to stab her with a knife from behind, and in this 
situation her skirt had moved up. Full of fear she had woken up.  
 
While, when telling this dream, she seems to be the victim of male aggression, the tide is 
turning; in the course of the session she more and more develops an urge to intrude the 
analyst’s head. She wants, as she emphasizes by rhythmically spoken words (see 
Buchholz, Spiekermann, Kächele 2015), to intrude the analyst’s head, and when 
expressing this desire she colourfully changes between the metaphorical and the material 
meaning of the word “head”. It is not at all that she just wants to intrude her analyst’s 
“mind”, but definitely she actually means the head. She remembers an “old story” of her 
father who, she says, had always been too soft: 
 
P: it’s a really old fear (3) that you can’t stand it you know my father never stood 
[anything (2) you wouldn’t believe how soft my father [is  
P: is ne ganz alte Befürchtung (3) dass Sie’s nicht aushalten mein Vater hat ja nie 
was [ausgehalten (2) Sie glauben gar nicht wie weich mein Vater [ist 
T:               [yes:                                                                                    [mhm  
T:         [Ja:                                                                           [mhm 
 (2) 
P: He didn’t stand anything=  
P: nix hat der ausgehalten= 
T:                                        =but then, it is even more important if my head is still 
really hard! This will indeed increase h::ow (1) well (.) >strong you will grasp<.  
T:                                 =aber umso mehr ist dann wichtig ob mein Kopf noch 
wirklich hart ist! Das steigert ja dann auch di::e (1) äh (.) >Härte des Zupackens<. 
11 P:                          hhh. 
T: F:or if it is hard then you must still:: then it is easier to find out (.) yes! How hard is 
it now, after all,  isn’t it?  
T: de:nn wenn er hart ist dann muss man ja noch:: dann kann man ja eher aus=raus 
(.) kriegen ja! wie hart ist er nun, nicht wahr? 
P:  °yes°   yes and you can grasp more strongly and=  
P: °ja°  ja und man kann härter zupacken und= 
T:                                                                           =exa:ctly=  
T:                                                      =Gena:u= 
P:                                                                                           =Yes!= 
P:                                                                                      =Ja!= 
T:                                                                                                 =mh mh mh 
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P: and you can better (1) fight with the knife  
P: und kann besser (1) bis aufs Messer kämpfen 
 
Here the participants do not understand the knife to be a sex symbol, as might be 
suggested by a primitive reading of psychoanalysis, but definitely the patient connects it 
to her dream as an offensive weapon. However, whereas when telling her dream she 
passively fears the knife, here she changes her position. Her desire for a father who could 
stand something is not only accepted by the therapist but he offers himself so to speak as 
a “sparring partner” (from line 7 on). A few sentences later she wants to intrude the 
therapist’s head, when saying that sometimes she also sees other people and looks at their 
heads: 
 
P: really very bad! Then I yes= and measured other heads  
P: schon ganz schlimm! Dann bin ich ja[=und hab andere Kö[pfe vermessen 
T:                                                              [YES                          [mm mm mh  
T                                                          [JA                              [mm mm   mh 
P: I did this (1) perhaps during my studies sometimes (-) then I had such a time  
 (1,2)  
P: das hab ich (1) vielleicht im Studium mal getan [(-) da hatt ich so ne Zeit 
T:                                                                                 [Yes                      Yes  
T:                                                                            [Ja                              Ja 
P: and now it happened again (..) indeed triggered by you  
P: und das kam jetzt auch wieder (..) eben durch Sie ausgelöst worn 
T: °hm hm° 
P: and THEN! =I=want=to QUITE (.) a small (.) hole in the head (.) in the  
P: und DA =will=ich=so ein GANZ (.) kleines bißchen (.) n Loch in den Kopf (.) in 
den 
T:        °mhm° 
P: Head! Hammer in the head (.)= 
P: Kopf! In den Kopf (.) schlagn= 
T:                                                 =mhm yes=  
T:                                              =mhm ja= 
P: =and put some of=of °my thoughts into it° °°like°°. This came to me  
P:und da ein bißchen was von=von °meinen Gedanken rein tun° °°so°°. Das kam 
mir 
T:    mhm 
P: the other day (..) if I could not somewhat exchange YOUR=dogma (.) for MINE P: 
neulich (--) ob ich nicht ein bißchen IHR=Dogma (.) gegen MEINS austauschen 
kann 
T:        mhhhhh.=mm ((rising voice)) 
P: Li=ke (.) li=ke (.) hhh. Li=ke I °°can°° °imagine you (-) 
P: So=wie [(.) so=wie [(.) hhhh. So=wie Si::e (3) ich mir °vorstellen °°kann°° 
 T:                   [ Yes       Yes  
T:              [Ja              [Ja 
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P: (-) putting your dogma (1) into mine 
P: (-) Ihr Dogma in meins (1) rein zu tun  
(2) 
P: and then the head found it easier to say than  
P:  und dann ging es mit dem Kopf leichter zu sagen als  
(2) 
T:          Yes 
T:      Ja 
P: I °°said°° to myself already on (2) Wednesday (1)  
P: ich hab’s mir schon am (2) Mittwoch  [(1)  °°gesagt°° 
T:                                                                   [mhm    And then also= also the 
intensification of your idea of joining a monastery would be a possibility to 
challenge me for a fight 
T:                                               [mhm  Und dann wäre auch=wäre  
 auch die Intensivierung Ihres Gedankens ins Kloster zu gehen eine Möglichkeit 
mich herauszufordern zu einem Kampf 
P: mhm 
T: to (.) for a fight which also (.) during which then you wo=uld be GRASPED (.) 
T: um Sie (.) nämlich zum Kampf der auch (.) bei dem Sie dann FEST=gehalten 
wür=den (.) 
P: hhhh. 
T: not=only be grasped (.) GRASP and try how how >°how=much=I=can=stand°<<  
T:nicht=nur selbst (.) FESThalten und ausprobieren wie wie 
[>>°wieiviel=ich=aushalt[e°<< 
P:   [hhhh.                              [ Yes  
P:  [hhhh                              [Ja 
T: but that then FINAlly! (1) during that fight I show how!=much I`m (.) interested! in 
you (.) NOT joining the monastery [but  
T: sondern dass ich dann auch ENDLich! (1) in dem Kampf zeige wie!=sehr mir (.) 
daran=gelegen ist! dass Sie (.) NICHT ins Kloster geh[en sondern= 
P:                                         [to   my mother  
P:                                     [zu meiner Mutter 
T: =remain staying 
T: =der Welt erhalten 
P: oh yes probably indeed  
P: ohja wahrscheinlich schon 
T: =in the world 
T: bleiben 
 
The passage which belongs to the context of communicative violence is the one where, 
repeating it three times and with rhythmic accentuation, she says this: 
 
P: and THEN! =I=want=to QUITE (.) a small (.) hole in the head (.) in the 
T:                        °mhm° 
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P: Head! Hammer in the head (.)= 
T:                      =mhm yes= 
P: =                             =and put some of=of °my thoughts into it° °°like°°. This came 
to me 
 
Doubtlessly, such statements by the patient, if we take them out of their context, indicate 
a tendency towards violence. The ways in which the therapist makes his statements, 
however, provide the patient with access to this violence, which in her dreams she still 
perceived as a threat, as a realm of her own activity. Quite obviously, in the case of 
Amalie the therapist considers himself an active participant in the process, tailoring his 
statements in a way enabling the patient to indeed listen to them as being process-
generated. Here, the therapeutic statements are no previously readymade “interventions” 
into a “problem”. 
 
The conversation solves an important problem: on the one hand, people see the therapist 
because of disturbances which are classifiable as illnesses/disorders and expect him/her to 
know a way of healing or alleviating them. On the other hand, treating the patient in such 
a way, categorically considering him/her most of all a “case of … (fear, depression, 
obsession)”, might make any therapeutic effort a failure right from the beginning. 
Precisely concerning his/her individual uniqueness and particularity, the patient would 
have the impression to be missed as a personality. Here, the process-generated formats of 
therapeutic statements solve the problem in an elegant way. They apply a form which 
presents itself less as advice or initiative but may rather be understood by the patient as 
an in each case conversational answer to that what she makes a topic of discussion. She 
may feel to be perceived as a unique individual, not as a “general case” – and that is an 
autonomous-sensitive therapeutic activity.  
 
The patient, on the other hand, opens up access to meanings and accepts them to be 
opened up by the therapist who at the end of the passage mentions that the patient would 
like to see him in a certain position – as the one demonstrating that he is interested in her. 
By the hint that he might not want her to join the monastery but to stay in the world, the 
topic of love and sexuality is gradually prepared. 
 
Here, the co-construction of the emphatic process can be reproduced in detail. The 
therapist’s accompanying, richly modulated prosodic statements will be observed in more 
detail in the course of a later analysis; their form seems to have most of all the function to 
tell the patient that the therapist is not afraid. Here, his lack of fear becomes a condition 
for violence to change; it is very beautifully demonstrated how violence could be a 
conversational co-construction in which a therapist could participate in the one, or indeed 
the other, way. This other way has always be called empathy, which can be observed here 
as a position working against violence to develop. Let us now move to another example, 
where empathy is mildly “blinded”, to move from there to the example of a strong 
communicative empathy blinder operating like a “flashbang”. 
 
A mild empathy blinder 
More recently, also the development of theory has caught up with that what was practiced 
by psychoanalysis already in the early 1970s. The discovery of mirror neurons (Ferrari 
and Gallese 2007; Gallese and Goldman 1998) provided important stimulations in this 
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context, just as the debate on the Theory-of-Mind Theory (Stueber 2006, Breithaupt 
2009, Breyer 2013). One might say that the common focus of criticism of this research is 
on empathy having previously been understood as a “one way street”. The experimental 
designs were made in such a way as to hardly allowing for emphasizing that for the 
emphatic party it is as important to get a correct understanding as it is for the one who is 
understood (Schlicht 2013). Empathy is not an epistemological but a mutual process of 
existential commitment, among whose means there also counts musicality (Buchholz 
2014). Also for the therapist it must become important that his patient understands him 
when he is trying to understand her.  
 
Thus, empathy as a jointly created communicative process replaces any theory of 
empathy being a “one way street”, with one party, by help of particular skills, 
empathizing with the other. Rather, empathy is understood to be a conversational 
coproduction jointly developed by the participants in the conversation. Heritage (2011) 
describes such co-productions in everyday conversation and demonstrates either 
strategies of the participants to, in a variety of ways, make others adjust to their narrations 
or strategies of reacting to certain narrations. For example, one such conversational 
strategy, that of “ancillary questions”, describes interested questions which obviously 
serve the purpose of enabling the listener to get an appropriate idea of that what is told; 
another strategy are those “response cries”, already described by Goffman (1978), by 
which one reacts if one is told about the painful procedures at the dentist.      
 
Such everyday patterns can be identified also during therapeutic conversations, however 
they give only an incomplete description of the emphatic overall architecture of 
therapeutic sessions. Thus, here we would like to give an example of a patient making it 
really difficult for the therapist to comprehend a situation he is told. Strictly saying, this 
might even be called “empathy blinding”. If empathy is seen as the antipode to violence, 
also such examples belong to the context of communicative violence.  
 
Also the here presented sequence comes from the first therapeutic session of the Ulm 
“student”. After a short welcome, the patient starts telling the therapist about his 
symptoms. He describes his obsession by the following words: 
 
P: [ (Well you know] =behaviour you know like control obsession (..) and when like 
(.) for example (.) I step out of the front door (.) >not then< but when I enter [then I 
have a look  
P:[(ja so)] =verhalten also so Kontrollzwang (--) und wenn i ja so (.) zum Beispiel 
(.) aus der Haustür rausgeh (.) >dann net< aber wenn ich reingeh [dann guck ich=       
T:   [hm:                 =yes 
T: [hm:              =ja 
P: at the back= 
P: nach hinten= 
T:        =yes 
T: =ja 
P: and I check if I have not forgotten anything or so  
P: und kontrolliere ob i auch nichts vergesse hab oder so 
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The patient tries to describe his control obsession by way of an exemplary situation: “and 
when like (.) for example”. This announcement is followed by an image, that he “step[s] 
out of the front door”. After a micro-pause there seems to follow a correction and a new 
image of his attempt at describing the situation, when he “enters” through the front door. 
In this context, the correction of the first image or the negation of the first example, “not 
then”, is placed in such a way that it is presented only after a micro-pause and 
immediately following the next image. Here develops irritation, due to the vagueness of 
the presented image and the thus intended invitation to be literally able to visualise his 
symptoms: it cannot be decided if his control obsession is demonstrated by the example 
of leaving or entering the house. This mismatch or incongruence of presented intention 
and action and the thus resulting irritation is impressively described by Greenspan and 
Shanker (2007) as well as Buchholz (2014).  
 
The form of this ambiguous format of expression has a function, the therapist reacts in a 
slightly irritated way, the further sequence from the conversation shows his efforts to get 
an appropriate image by help of the “ancillary question” – and his failure:  
 
P: [ (Well you know] =behaviour you know like control obsession (..) and when like 
(.) for example (.) I step out of the front door (.) >not then< but when I enter [then I 
have a look  
P:[(ja so)] =verhalten also so Kontrollzwang (--) und wenn i ja so (.) zum Beispiel 
(.) aus der Haustür rausgeh (.) >dann net< aber wenn ich reingeh [dann guck ich=       
T:   [hm:                 =yes 
T: [hm:              =ja 
P: at the back= 
P: nach hinten 
T:        =yes 
T: =ja 
P: and I check if I have not forgotten anything or so  
P: und kontrolliere ob i auch nichts vergesse hab oder so 
T: if you enter through the front [door  
T: wenn Sie reingehen in die Haustü[re 
P:                                                           [Yes when I leave it is not= 
P:                                                 [Ja wenn ich rausgeh net= 
T:                                             = then you check what;  
T:     =dann: kontrolliern Sie was; 
 (1.2) 
P: well, what, you know .hh  
P: ja was, also .hh 
T: and what do you look at then? If you? 
T: und wohin gucken Sie da? wenn Sie? 
P: To the floor, (.) usually  
P: aufn Bode, (.) in der Regel 
T: you look from the outside thus outside [you look?  
T: von draußen also draußen gucken [Sie? 
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P:                                                                 [no from the ins >>you know I really enter 
through the door or so<< [or (.) in front of the door after all  
P:        [nee von dri >>also i geh scho in die Tür hinei 
oder so<< [oder (.)vor der Tür eben 
T:                     [hm        hm 
T:              [hm        hm 
P: this now is quite a concrete thing  
P: dis wär jetz a ganz konkrete Sache 
T: ↑hm hm 
 
Once again the therapist makes sure if he has correctly understood his conversation 
partner “if you enter through the front [door”, again the patient answers by the irritating, 
contradicting image “Yes when I leave it is not”. The way of agreeing by saying “yes” 
must make the therapist believe that the obsessive-compulsive symptom appears when 
entering through the door, the then following part leaves it open if “not” is meant as a 
tag7 or a denial.  
 
This “game” is continued, the therapist asks about the direction: “you look from the 
outside thus outside [you look?”, in the context of which also here it stays unclear if the 
view is imagined from the outside or to the outside. Once again, the patient reacts to this 
vagueness by a new perspective “you know I really enter through the door”, thus 
repeatedly triggering an irritation due to his new point of view “in front of the door after 
all”. The summarising remark “this now is quite a concrete thing” sounds almost ironic, 
and the therapist seems to answer this unintendedly unclear “concrete thing” by his high-
pitched double “hm hm”. 
 
Such examples are not a rarity during therapeutic conversation, but to our knowledge 
they are as yet unanalysed. This is a mild example of emphatic blinding, for the therapist 
it is made so to speak lastingly difficult to understand the architecture of the situation 
when the patient’s obsessive-compulsory symptom appears. In a comprehensive way, the 
therapist cannot “see” what happens; his efforts to receive information by help of 
“ancillary questions” (Heritage 2011) are rejected in quite an everyday-practical sense – 
here by a lack of empathy from the patient’s side; this is where the therapist gives up and 
postpones his need of further explanation to a later moment.  
 
Here we would like to go on by a much more drastic example of a “communicative 
flashbang” from our study on criminal sexual offenders (Buchholz, Lamott and Mörtl 
2008), to illustrate this way how in therapy situations sometimes things happen for which 
Heritage’s scheme (2011) is insufficient.  
 
                                                
7 The term “tag” is used by conversation analysis for those “sweet little nothings” by way  of which  agreement  is  demanded during  a  conversation;  other  examples  are “gell?”,  “ne”  in  German,  “isn´t  it”  in  English,  “oder”  in  Swiss  German  etc.  (see Jefferson 2012). Translator´s remark:  the patient speaks a Bavarian dialect,  saying „net” which here  is translated by „not”. Other than in English, in the Bavarian dialect 
“net” may as well mean something like “innit”.  
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The sexual offenders of our study were admitted for a social-therapeutic ward in prison, 
after their prospects having been judged as being sufficiently promising. There they 
participated in a completely video-recorded group therapy (for details see Buchholz et al. 
2008). The therapists encouraged the participants a. o. to unfold the narratives of their 
offences, that is to tell about the offences for which they had been sentenced to prison. 
The example gives a conversation following such a story; one group member, Sepp, asks 
the one who has told his story, Otto, a question which refers to the narration of his 
offence. This narration has produced the information that the narrator, Otto, has been 
banned from making contact to his son. 
 
Sepp B.: I would like to know – that thing about your son. Why are you allowed to see 
him only after he has turned 18? Or Sepp  
B.: Mich würde interessieren - mit deinem Sohn. Warum darfst du den erst, wenn er 
18 ist, sehen? Oder 
 (.) 
Otto O.: Because it happened with my son=  
Otto O.: Weil es passiert ist mit meinem Sohn= 
Therapist K.:                                                 =What happened?  
Therapeut K.:     =Was is passiert? 
 (1) 
Otto O.: After I well had abused him [once. Although it is not=  
Otto O.: Seit ich ihn mal äh  
missbraucht [habe missbraucht habe (.) Obwohl es nicht 
Therapist K.:        [pardon?=  
Therapeut K.:    [Bitte? 
Otto O.: = true (-) He was only present.  
Otto O.: stimmt (-) Er war nur dabei gewesen. 
Therapist K: He was present?  
Therapeut K.: Er war dabei? 
Otto O.: He was present.  
Otto O.: Er war dabei gewesen. 
Therapist K.: Present  
Therapeut K.: Dabei gewesen 
Otto O.: All right, I will tell you once again how it happened with my son. We:ll:: Otto 
O.: Gut, ich erzähle noch einmal wie es passiert ist mit meinem Sohn. A:lso:: 
Therapist K.: This is perhaps important after all.  
Therapeut K.: Das ist ja vielleicht auch wichtig. 
 
Sepp’s question about the narration indicates (Heritage 2011, 2012, 2013) that his 
knowledge status is K- (K minus); by this question he shows that there is something he 
has not yet understood or does not know. To such a question we would expect a piece of 
information which balances the mutual knowledge in such a way as to equal the 
inquirer’s knowledge to Otto ‘s. Such as a statement like: “because the court has banned 
me from him” or something like that. However, there is a break after the break following 
Otto’s “or”, and starting by “because” he gives an explanation which, by the formulation 
“because it happened” immediately negates his own actor’s competence and 
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responsibility. The therapist reacts to this by quickly stepping in, and now Otto changes 
to a design, which accepts his own competence as an actor. It had been him, he admits, 
who abused his son. This way the reason why he is banned from seeing his son is at least 
hinted at.  
 
Let us stop here for a moment. Otto answers Sepp’s question by way of a kind of 
categorising activity, which rather refers to himself than to changing the inquirer’s 
knowledge status. By the same move he refers to himself as a non-actor; he starts a 
complex transformation of his own position within the legal agenda: he changes from 
being an offender to being a witness. It is this irritation, we may assume, to which the 
therapist reacts by his overlapping “pardon?”, and Otto answers as if the therapist had not 
listened. He repeats the last part of his speech and adds that “it is not true”. His son had 
“only been present”. If one listens to children, for example when they are saying “Now 
you are the robber”, one may clearly observe their categorisation activities. The other is 
categorised as a “robber”, however only “for fun”. The category of fun is indicated by 
“now” – just leave it out, and you will at once note the difference. 
 
In Otto’s case one can leave out the word “only” – then his sentence is completely trivial: 
we may assume that somebody was present when being abused. What is the burden this 
“only” bears? “Only” indicates a change of the son’s status, also he changes from being 
victim to being a witness who was “only present”, and the way of having been present is 
transformed into being a somewhat coincidental witness. This transformation of position 
is called “footing” since Goffmann; one so to speak “has a different relation” to each 
other (Goodwin 2007). This kind of analysis might explain the way in which the therapist 
joins now. He reformulates “He was present?” and these three words are conversationally 
somewhat switched; three times in a row question and answer are exchanged without any 
change of content.  
 
This leads to a particular effect. By way of this complex conversational operation Otto 
takes the speaker position of a witness, whereas previously Sepp has addressed him as a 
perpetrator. And there is more: the therapist confirms Otto’s position as a witness and 
retreats to the position of a listener.  
 
If one discusses scenarios of this kind with other therapists, not seldom they shake their 
head and wonder why the therapist did not take notice of this. However, one may be 
assured that such things happen several times a day to anybody working in the field of 
therapy; then it may be that we speak of an attack on thinking or on connections. To our 
knowledge it has as yet not been analysed how (by asking about the way) such attacks 
happen exactly. If it is typical for them that as a participant in such a conversation one 
does not notice them, one will not notice them. At least not as long as one has no 
transcripts at hand for an analysis but must rely on one’s own memory for minutes which 
are sometimes taken down after a long day of practical work. However, it is these ways 
of confusing categories, which powerfully devaluates the hermeneutics of therapy. 
Theory calls this an “attack on thinking” (Bion 1963). This is a description of the 
function. A kind of behaviour we are not aware of as well as defence manoeuvres are 
conversationally staged, which way understanding, hermeneutics-based possibilities to 
answer are literally blinded. But it is not that this behaviour we are unaware of must 
always be worked out by way of analysis; our example shows in detail that it appears 
both at the visible and audible surface of the conversation if only we look at the details 
closely enough (Buchholz 2011). 
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Concluding Remark 
The selection of sequences has been purposefully restricted to those where violence can 
be observed within the context of speech interaction. Here it is less about damage caused 
by violating the boundaries of the private sphere but about subtleties of the therapeutic 
conversation for which the negotiation of closeness and distance, the roles of “leading 
and following” and the shaping of a professional relationship are essential. Both therapist 
and patient move within a conversational field within which they mutually influence each 
other’s position. Irritations are created by incongruent conversational hints, e. g. by rising 
intonation indicating that one is going to continue, to be followed, however, by a very 
long break which again signals that it is the other’s turn. On the one hand, such linguistic 
subtleties depict the shaping of the relationship, on the other hand a certain atmosphere of 
the relationship climate is only established this way. The corrections made in the context 
of such interactions may allow for new relationship experiences and, depending on the 
way in which they are solved, support or weaken the therapeutic relationship.  
 
Intentions and attitudes are mutually investigated and communicated, in the context of 
which a common foundation of empathy may develop on whose basis interactive-
conversational acts of violence can be balanced, which on the one hand influence this 
foundation and are on the other hand based on it, as it could be demonstrated by the 
example of Amalie and the rupture-repair cycle. In which way these conversations 
influence process and outcome of therapy must be analysed by future research. Also 
those communicative “blindings” may be supposed to be of significance which have not 
yet been analysed when it comes to the process of therapy. They are more than “face 
work” in the sense Goffman (1955) introduced the term. Face work means defensive 
maneuvers securing one’s own status against dangers aof being blamed. “Blindings”, and 
in the strong form of communicative “flashbangs” are violent act directed to others and 
thus, they damage. In therapeutic process they have not yet achieved necessary attention. 
Here answers will to be created that cross over an understanding of therapy as a 
hermeneutic act. The fine-grained conversation analysis makes visible, what in 
therapeutic discourse is more hidden under too global concepts like transference-
countertransference, resistance, attack on thinking, projective identification etc. Althoug 
we started from rough examples, our examples show the “pull of hostility” (Lippe et al. 
2008). They demonstrate how complex the tightrope walk between autonomy-sensitive 
confrontation and verbal infringement is. The theme should be released from all 
scandalization. How a patient’s violence by an extremely skillfull therapist can be 
handled shows the example of Amalia; the therapist arrives in a kind of tender tone, 
unexpected by the patient. That “blindings” on the other hand can actively obstruct 
empathy so deeply desired could be shown by other examples.  
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